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Financial intermediation has made a substantial recovery since the 2001–02 economic and 
financial crisis, when the domestic financial system suffered a huge implosion. Trends have 
been favourable for most monetary variables, as well as for deposits, loans to the private 
sector, and interest rates. In spite of this growth, the ratios of loans to the private sector/GDP 
(around 12%), private M2/GDP and private M3/GDP (12.9% and 18.5% respectively) are still 
at very low levels compared to our own experience or those of other emerging economies. In 
addition, many areas of the Argentine economy are still highly dollarised.  
Those factors imply particular challenges for the design and implementation of domestic 
monetary policy. For instance, the economy’s dollarisation means that the nominal exchange 
rate is of key importance if Argentina is to avoid the boom and bust cycles and periodic 
crises that have characterised the last 60 years. At the same time, given the low degree of 
financial deepening – around 12% of GDP – the effectiveness of the interest rate in 
correcting monetary imbalances is reduced and the function of transmission channels 
correspondingly weakened.  
In this environment, the importance of foreign banks – which suffered during the 2001–02 
financial crises from their high balance sheet exposure to the exchange rate – have been 
growing since 2003 but without regaining the relative importance in the domestic financial 
system that they had during the 1990s. It is important to note that, both in the local financial 
crisis of 2001–02 and in the international one of 2008, foreign financial institutions followed 
conservative financial policies in the domestic market. 
1.  International banks, financial markets and monetary policy 
During the 1990s, foreign banks significantly expanded their market share in Argentina. 
Foreign capital flowed into the financial sector, particularly from Spanish, French and 
Canadian institutions. Between December 1995 and December 2001, foreign banks 
increased their share of both deposits and loans to the private sector. Their share of total 
deposits grew from 19% to 52% (Table 1), and that of private sector deposits from 22% to 
56% (Table 2). At the same time, their share of total private loans to the private sector 
increased from 18% to almost 51%, with their share of the US dollar-denominated segment 
rising from 22% to 55%.  
                                                  




Deposits and Loans by Group of Banks  
In millions of pesos 
  Dec 95  Dec 97 Dec 01 Dec 02 Dec 03 Dec 05 Dec 07  Oct 10 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 
Total 
Public banks  17'637  23'958 21'454 30'477 41'794 60'536 88'065  167'462
National private banks  18'465  19'030 10'065 13'430 20'645 37'199 57'900  101'964
Foreign private banks  8'721  27'360 34'713 30'897 31'980 38'469 58'819  86'007
NBFE 324  347 226 196 216 289 767  1'030
Financial system  45'147  70'695 66'458 75'001 94'635 136'492 205'550  356'463
Foreign currency 
Public banks  8'435  11'751 14'205 1'480 2'587 4'545 7'714  26'069
National private banks  10'762  10'414 6'716 856 1'833 3'957 7'136  14'808
Foreign private banks  5'675  15'737 26'383 777 1'935 4'471 8'842  21'562
NBFE 236  228 181 13 14 19 22.44  0
Financial system  25'109  38'131 47'486 3'126 6'370 12'993 23'715  62'439
PRIVATE SECTOR DEPOSITS In national and foreign currency 
Public banks  13'088  16'359 17'790 21'289 27'653 32'665 46'621  79'069
National private banks  18'189  17'677 9'172 10'689 17'025 30'143 49'767  80'144
Foreign private banks  8'691  26'877 34'083 27'545 30'072 37'716 57'904  79'769
NBFE 324  345 225 175 201 285 757  1'015
Financial system  40'292  61'257 61'270 59'698 74'951 100'809 155'048  239'996
Foreign currency     
Public banks  7'404  9'682 12'748 1'052 1'984 3'012 5'955  12'366
National private banks  10'750  10'280 6'519 745 1'743 3'878 6'850  14'305
Foreign private banks  5'671  15'718 26'070 763 1'889 4'448 8'799  18'334
NBFE 236  228 181 13 14 19 22.452  68
Financial system  24'061  35'908 45'517 2'573 5'629 11'357 21'628  45'073
LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR In national and foreign currency 
Public banks  20'797  20'008 13'655 11'753 10'053 15'529 27'549  51'312
National private banks  20'952  15'101 10'135 8'510 9'779 18'703 39'879  66'770
Foreign private banks  9'428  26'880 26'464 17'537 13'037 20'328 38'708  59'955
NBFE 701  1'065 1'785 671 529 1'326 4'219  5'790
Financial system  51'878  63'055 52'039 38'470 33'398 55'885 110'355  183'828
Foreign currency     
Public banks  9'227  11'080 9'841 901 757 2'498 4'941  7'000
National private banks  14'569  9'070 6'130 920 775 2'194 5'956  9'583
Foreign private banks  6'873  18'146 21'039 3'949 2'833 3'542 7'284  10'949
NBFE 517  727 1'212 12 20 16 32  102
Financial system  31'187  39'023 38'222 5'782 4'385 8'249 18'212  27'633
Source: BCRA 




Deposits and Loans by Group of Banks 
As % of total deposits and loans 
  Dec 95  Dec 97 Dec 01 Dec 02 Dec 03 Dec 05  Dec 07  Oct 10 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 
Total 
Public banks  39%  34% 32% 41% 44% 44%  43%  47%
National private banks  41%  27% 15% 18% 22% 27%  28%  29%
Foreign private banks  19%  39% 52% 41% 34% 28%  29%  24%
NBFE 1%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%
Financial system  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%
Foreign currency                 
Public banks  34%  31% 30% 47% 41% 35%  33%  42%
National private banks  43%  27% 14% 27% 29% 30%  30%  24%
Foreign private banks  23%  41% 56% 25% 30% 34%  37%  35%
NBFE 1%  1% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%
Financial system  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%
PRIVATE SECTOR DEPOSITS In national and foreign currency 
Public banks  32%  27% 29% 36% 37% 32%  30%  33%
National private banks  45%  29% 15% 18% 23% 30%  32%  33%
Foreign private banks  22%  44% 56% 46% 40% 37%  37%  33%
NBFE 1%  1% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%
Financial system  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%
Foreign currency                 
Public banks  31%  27% 28% 41% 35% 27%  28%  27%
National private banks  45%  29% 14% 29% 31% 34%  32%  32%
Foreign private banks  24%  44% 57% 30% 34% 39%  41%  41%
NBFE 1%  1% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%
Financial system  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%
LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR In national and foreign currency 
Public banks  40%  32% 26% 31% 30% 28%  25%  28%
National private banks  40%  24% 19% 22% 29% 33%  36%  36%
Foreign private banks  18%  43% 51% 46% 39% 36%  35%  33%
NBFE 1%  2% 3% 2% 2% 2%  4%  3%
Financial system  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%
Foreign currency                 
Public banks  30%  28% 26% 16% 17% 30%  27%  25%
National private banks  47%  23% 16% 16% 18% 27%  33%  35%
Foreign private banks  22%  47% 55% 68% 65% 43%  40%  40%
NBFE 2%  2% 3% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%
Financial system  100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%
Source: BCRA 
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However, the role of foreign banks in the domestic market has receded since the end of 
2001, when the convertibility of the Argentine peso lapsed. The impact of the ending of 
peso/US dollar parity on foreign banks is clearly reflected in Tables 1 and 2. While some of 
the international banks that entered the Argentine market in the 1990s withdrew in the 
aftermath of the crisis, those that stayed adopted very conservative domestic lending and 
funding strategies. They scaled back their market share in loans and, even more so, in 
deposits. The public’s perception was that local banks, either private or public, were more 
secure in terms of the possibility of “recovering” its savings. This view was reinforced when, 
as mentioned above, some international banks abruptly decided to cease their operations in 
Argentina, raising doubts as to the intentions of all foreign institutions. 
As the economy recovered through 2003–10, with average annual GDP growth of around 
8%, conditions for the financial sector improved continuously. Foreign banks now hold about 
one quarter of total deposits or just over one third if only private sector total deposits are 
considered. For dollar-denominated deposits, these ratios increase to 35% and 41% 
respectively. Moreover, two foreign banks from other emerging markets have decided to 
enter Argentina’s financial market during the past few years. It is also worth noting that, 
following the 2007–08 crisis (and contrary to the trend in previous crises), US dollar-
denominated deposits posted a slight increase in Argentina, helping foreign banks to 
increase their share of deposits. For this reason, international banks increased their share of 
US dollar-denominated deposits from 15% in December 2007 to 23% in October 2010 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Share of Deposits and Loans in Foreign Currency – By Group of Banks  
As % of total deposits and loans 
  Dec 95  Dec 97 Dec 01 Dec 02 Dec 03 Dec 05  Dec 07  Oct 10 
TOTAL DEPOSITS 
Public banks  47.8  49.0  66.2  4.9 6.2 7.5 8.8  15.6 
National private banks  58.3 54.7 66.7  6.4  8.9  10.6 12.3 14.5 
Foreign private banks  65.1 57.5 76.0  2.5  6.1  11.6 15.0 25.1 
NBFE  72.9  65.8  80.1  6.5 6.3 6.7 2.9 0.0 
Financial system  55.6 53.9 71.5  4.2  6.7  9.5  11.5 17.5 
PRIVATE SECTOR DEPOSITS 
Public banks  56.6 59.2 71.7  4.9  7.2  9.2  12.8 15.6 
National private banks  59.1 58.2 71.1  7.0  10.2 12.9 13.8 17.8 
Foreign private banks  65.3 58.5 76.5  2.8  6.3  11.8 15.2 23.0 
NBFE  73.0  66.2  80.2  7.3 6.8 6.7 3.0 6.7 
Financial system  59.7 58.6 74.3  4.3  7.5  11.3 13.9 18.8 
LOANS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Public banks  44.4 55.4 72.1  7.7  7.5  16.1 17.9 13.6 
National private banks  69.5 60.1 60.5 10.8  7.9  11.7 14.9 14.4 
Foreign private banks  72.9 67.5 79.5 22.5 21.7 17.4 18.8 18.3 
NBFE  73.8  68.2  67.9  1.8 3.8 1.2 0.8 1.8 
Financial system  60.1 61.9 73.4 15.0 13.1 14.8 16.5 15.0 
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In their lending to the private sector, foreign institutions have behaved more cautiously than 
local banks. They account for about one third of total lending to the private sector, and 40% 
of dollar-denominated loans. The latter statistic reflects the traditional strength of foreign 
banks in trade finance. 
Foreign banks accounted for USD 7.4 billion of bank capital raised in Argentina between 
2003 and 2007, more than half of the total capital raised in this period (see Table 4 and 
Graph 1). It is worth noting that, having survived the 2001–02 crisis, some banks, including 
foreign institutions, were able to raise funds in the international capital markets in 2006–07.  
Table 4 
Capitalization of the Financial System 
In millions of pesos 




Public banks  42 33  2'050 100  792 8  38 77 17  3'158  17.4 
National private banks 441  166  351  579  1'339 830 67 146 33  3'952  21.8 
Foreign private banks  2'090 2'784 2'017 1'469 192  974  129  9  0  9'665  53.3 
NBFE  390 7  12 70  113  83  647  11 30  1'362  7.5 
Financial system  2'963 2'990 4'431 2'218 2'437 1'895 881 242  80  18'136  100.0
























* to October 
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About 80% of banks’ funding (liabilities + net worth) comes from deposits. This reflects a 
framework of adequate liquidity and low leverage ratios, a significant characteristic of the 
domestic financial system. If we consider only private deposits, the ratio is 53%, rising to 
70% in the case of foreign private banks. Although these figures can be seen as a deficiency 
in terms of funding duration, they also have a positive aspect if we consider the low degree of 
concentration in deposits. Additionally, the predominance of local deposits in banks’ funding 
helped to moderate the effects of the crisis on banks, as compared with the outcome in 
economies with a higher degree of market funding.  
In view of proposed changes in international regulations and standards and their implications 
for international banks, it is worth outlining the main characteristics of today’s financial 
system in Argentina. The complex financial instruments and off-balance sheet exposures that 
caused problems in advanced economies, including mortgage-backed securities, 
collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps, were virtually not in use in Argentina. 
Capital adequacy as a percentage of risk-weighted-assets is well above the 8% Basel 
minimum. In fact, over the 2003–10 period, the ratio of capital/risk-weighted assets for 
different groups of banks has remained well above the 8% line (Table 5 and Graph 2), with 
foreign institutions posting slightly higher ratios than those of domestic private sector banks 
(eg 22.7% in 2009 and 20.85% in 2010). Additionally, from 2010 all banks in Argentina have 
been required to maintain  a capital conservation buffer (a limit to earnings distributions) 
equal to 30% of their total capital requirement. Meanwhile, local regulations ensure that 
banks hold an appropriate level of liquidity in the form of high-quality assets such as cash 
and deposits at the Central Bank. For all these reasons, it is not expected that tighter 
international liquidity or capital requirements will greatly affect the operations of either foreign 
or domestic banks. 
 
Table 5 
Capital Compliance According to Regulation 
As % of risk-weighted assets 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010* 
Public  banks  13.9 10.8 11.5 12.8 12.0 12.9 11.5 11.8 
Private  banks  14.0 15.1 17.8 18.6 19.2 18.3 22.5 20.8 
NBFE  73.7 46.6 47.0 39.6 31.1 38.1 42.4 50.8 
Financial system  15.1  14.0  15.9 16.9 16.9 16.9 18.8 18.0 
*  to October  
Source: BCRA 




Capital Compliance As % of Risk-weighted Assets 



























2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
%
Private banks Financial system Public banks
8% Basel I
* to October 
Source: BCRA 
2. Exchange  rates 
As previously mentioned, in spite of the improvements accomplished in recent years, the 
Argentine economy still has a significant degree of dollarisation. Many economic and 
financial transactions such as the purchase and sale of real estate are customarily settled in 
US dollars (sometimes in specie) and savings decisions are also made in foreign currency.  
In these circumstances, currency mismatch combined with exchange rate volatility is a 
significant threat to financial stability, spreading volatility through the economy and leading to 
both economic and employment losses. Graph 3 shows the currency mismatch that existed 
in the Argentina financial system at the end of peso/dollar convertibility. Although foreign 
exchange assets and liabilities appear to be hedged, almost half of total foreign currency 
loans were granted to “non-tradable firms” (ie firms that did not generate revenues in foreign 
currencies); these borrowers were unable to repay their loans when the peso was devalued 
by more than 200% at the beginning of 2002. The present situation is different in that banks 
are permitted to make foreign currency loans only to firms (mainly exporters) that have 
foreign currency income, thus limiting the currency mismatch. In addition, limits on banks’ net 
open negative currency positions have been introduced with a view to preventing exchange 



































Note: Non-tradable sector financing estimate considers loans in foreign currency to households, construction 
sector, gas, water, electricity and other services. 
Source: BCRA 
 
Such problems could be exacerbated by persistent large short-term inflows or outflows of 
capital. Against that background, an increasing number of emerging countries – including 
Argentina – started to apply different kind of regulation controls to short-term capital inflows 
with the aim of dampening exchange rate volatility. 
For all these reasons, it is important for policymakers to set a predictable and smooth path 
for the nominal exchange rate. Argentina’s monetary policy is therefore designed to keep 
nominal exchange rate changes under control in order to reduce short-term volatility, and to 
serve as a key economic signal for consumers, investors and exporters. Argentina’s foreign 
exchange market is also exposed to a huge seasonality that arises from the fluctuating 
proceeds of agricultural commodity exports. This increases the importance of limiting the rise 
of benchmark interest rates to avoid magnifying incentives for short-term financial inflows.  
After peso/dollar convertibility lapsed, a single free foreign exchange market (Mercado Único 
y Libre de Cambios or MULC) was instituted with the aim of regulating the foreign exchange 
market. Through the MULC, the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market by 
buying foreign currency to prevent nominal exchange rate volatility and to accumulate 
precautionary currency reserves. It is worth noting that the central bank has accounted on 
average for only about 7% of MULC’s total trading volume over the past five years, with a 
maximum of 9% in 2009 and minima of 6% in 2007 and 2010. 
By these interventions, the central bank creates an expansion of the monetary base when it 
buys dollars, which left to itself would cause the domestic interest rate to fall. However, the 
central bank offsets the expansion through sterilisation operations that absorb the increase in 




Foreign Currency Mismatch (Assets – Liabilities) / Net worth  
(%) 
Average 2000  78.2 
Average 2001  66.4 
Dec.01 91.4 
Average 2002  36.8 
Average 2003  57.2 
Average 2004  67.7 
Average 2005  48.1 
Average 2006  36.0 
Average 2007  27.2 
Average 2008  25.0 
Average 2009  33.2 
Average 2010  30.9 
Source: BCRA  
 
3.  Foreign exchange market intervention, regulation, balance sheets 
and alternative policy instruments 
During the last nine years, Argentina has run a continuous current account surplus, based on 
a solid trade surplus and increasing capital inflows – the latter attracted by the attractive 
yields on Argentine securities vis-à-vis international benchmarks as domestic 
macroeconomic fundamentals improved vigorously including the process of normalization of 
the public debt that began in 2005.  
Under these conditions, the central bank buys the capital inflows and the trade surplus in the 
MULC, expanding the monetary aggregates. At the same time, the bank has continued to 
execute a policy of partially sterilised intervention by absorbing much of the liquidity 
generated by the purchase of foreign exchange coming from the external sector. This is 
achieved mainly by the issuance of central bank bills (LEBACs) and notes (NOBACs). 
At different times, the sterilisation policy has been carried out through a variety of 
mechanisms including: (i) the anticipated cancellation of rediscounts granted during the 
2001–02 crisis (this was one of the main monetary contraction factors in 2005 and one of the 
most significant contraction factors in 2006), (ii) the issuance of non-monetary short- and 
medium-term debt (LEBACs and NOBACs), (iii) net issuance of reverse repos; (iv) the 
(occasional) sale of sovereign bonds held in the central bank’s portfolio and (v) changes in 
the minimum reserve requirements. 
Table 7 shows the trend of LEBACs and NOBACs outstanding in the 2002–10 period. It 
should be noted that, even though the total outstanding value of central bank securities 
appears to have reached a maximum in nominal terms, the amount is still below its historical 
peak if measured in relation to the monetary base, international reserves and M3, which 




Stock of LEBAC and NOBAC  
(end of December, in million of $) 
   LEBAC NOBAC TOTAL 
2002 3'671  –  3'671 
2003 10'088  178  10'266 
2004 13'499  1'335  14'834 
2005 19'685  6'777  26'462 
2006 13'179  27'676  40'856 
2007 20'634  30'863  51'497 
2008 9'418  27'908  37'326 
2009 34'646  12'181  46'828 
2010 47'905  26'446  74'352 
Source: BCRA  
 
As most of these assets were taken up by domestic banks, the central bank was able to 
provide liquidity to the system during the crisis by repurchasing some of these instruments. 
And, as mentioned above, the sterilisation policy has also helped to manage the trend of 
benchmark interest rates to reduce incentives for short-term financial inflows.  
From September 2002, Argentina started to adopt a more active regulatory stance on 
financial flows. The policies and measures aimed at controlling short-term financial flows 
(both inflows and outflows) are tools of countercyclical policy that cushion the effects of 
sudden shifts of financial flows over the economic cycle and help to bring down volatility in 
domestic financial markets. 
That said, the regulations are primarily aimed at discouraging short-term financial inflows. 
They initially prescribed that inflows should stay within the domestic system for a minimum of 
90 days, a term that was later extended to 180 and finally to 365 days. Capital inflows that 
finance real investments are exempted from this requirement.  
In 2005, when short-term financial inflows began to accelerate, the government implemented 
a statutory interest-free one-year deposit of 30% of any amount entering the MULC, a 
requirement that is still in place for this type of short-term financial inflow.  
Investment by non-residents in LEBACs and NOBACs grew from $2.6 billion in December 
2006 to $7.36 billion just one year later. For this reason, in 2007, it was decided to prohibit 
non-residents from investing in these instruments, with the aim of increasing the 
effectiveness of the central bank’s transactions on the foreign exchange open market. As 
from October 2007, only domestic bills and notes have been issued. These instruments can 
only be traded locally and holders must be residents. 
In 2008, as some foreign exchange regulations were being circumvented through local 
securities transactions in the stock market, new administrative measures were established in 
coordination with the National Securities Commission. These regulations provide that traded 
securities must be held in the seller’s accounts for a minimum of three days before they can 
be sold on. In addition, rules were set for local banks and brokers on wire transfers to foreign 
counterparts. 